'Illegals' have precedent

I recall reading a few years ago about the unwitting admittance into Australia via the refugee program of a war criminal - an error only righted by his victims, forced to live within proximity of him. 

This very serious need for scrutiny is sometimes the tenor of government defensiveness over Australia's refugee intake and may also be where xenophobic positions gain mainstream traction. 

So imagine my surprise when I am reading about the cocooning of neo-nazism in certain regions of the world when I came across some interesting historical data:

It goes on to discuss

Journalist Information Warrants - Surveillance of Australian Journalists Pt. 3

This post on Journalist Information Warrants continues on from the first and second in this series, elaborating on the info in those posts building up a bit of public knowledge about the stressors on journalism work.

Many people won't realize that it is not possible in the age of mass surveillance for a journalist to fulfil obligations to confidentiality, anymore. Ubiquitous CCTV will show sources heading to a meeting, sim, phone and device location data is harvested for on-selling to 3rd parties, mobile, echoes and landlines can be used for sound interception, and, if that doesn't un-do the dedicated whistleblower, then the use of retrospective and third party warrants will.

Such an environment is indicative of an imbalance in society between the needs of the state and the democratic needs of the individual. In the US this need to protect the rights of individuals to enable democracy is evident in the 1st Amendment of the Constitution. However, Australia has no constitutional rights in this regard and no bill of rights, either, and the ethical infrastructure of human rights law has not progressed at the same pace as surveillance law.

So these JIW posts aim to increase awareness of the problems of free speech and free media here in Australia - a 'constitutional' monarchy democratic system, in which the balance of power has been weighted in favour of institutional needs since the establishment of the penal colony. Media surveillance reform & press freedom is an area that represents an excellent opportunity for Australia - a young country (less than 120 y/o), to strengthen the quality of its democratic values and freedoms.

In a conservative era it can be really hard getting through to people about why they need to be free to ventilate their insurmountable issues in the media, and for society to be able to be alerted to potential problems or government corruption.

With these things in mind, today's post - more specifics on definitions - is a little technical but hopefully not too much so.

One or two of the links require access to a uni library database, so if you are a student or a lecturer you can access these when you are logged into your uni (for those who aren't logged in all the time).

Definition’s Effect

Currently, ASIO is only required to account to the Commonwealth Attorney General if they desire to surveil a person whose activities may fall within the limited definition of a journalist. 

In 2017 the AFP announced at Senate Estimates it had been unnecessary to apply for any warrants since the implementation of the safeguards (McGuirk, 2017), and ASIO reported they had also had little need to apply for warrants (AAP, 2017). 

The highly interpretative journalist definition in Journalist Information Warrant provisions remains the same [9] as that of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 s. 180 (G):

(i)                   a person who is working in a professional capacity as a journalist; or

(ii)                 an employer of such a person

The AFP refer to a forty-year-old definition of a journalist contained in the 2019 amended act [9] that pre-dates the rise of digital communications that purportedly necessitate the warrant scheme. Despite repeated clarifications and extensions, the AFP do not further define or update the definition(Pettersson, 2017). 

The Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA) has repeatedly appealed to the government to draft into legislation one consistent and fair definition. MEAA’s position is clearly stated in its recent parliamentary submissions to the inquiries regarding Economics Legislation(2017), and, the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill (2017). 

MEAA highlight definitional limitations of a journalist’s employer underpinning the utilization of the financial capacity of a media outlet are out of date; likewise, defining a journalist worthy of legislative protection by a financial arrangement with such an institution, is further limiting and ‘anachronistic’ (MEAA, 2018).

That outdated government definition of journalists and their earning methods, secondarily restricted which media workers and outlets may extend confidentiality to a source; to whom a source may confide, and, what platforms safeguarded content can be published on. 

The term ‘news medium’ and Evidence Act 1995 journalist definition (s.126J) were less problematic with the capacity of media workers to produce news(MEAA, 2018), and the 2018 report of the 2017 Senate Committee has supported MEAA’s stance(MEAA, 2018). 

Compounding this overall lack of privacy for journalistic processes(Mann, 2018, p. 13), under s.313 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act, 84 agencies have simply bypassed the metadata warrant system after access was reduced in 2015, from 81 to 21 agencies (Pearce, 2018). 

Authorised agencies were implicated in funnelling citizens’ metadata to unauthorized agencies (Mann et al, 2018, p. 369). In an increasingly imbalanced privacy-security dynamic (Mann et al, 2018), journalists are afforded few professional considerations compared to the needs of institutions, and may be jailed for two years for disclosure of any Journalist Information Warrant(Ackland, 2015).

An institutional resistance to regulatory reform has seen Australia listed 21^st in the 2019 World Press Freedom Index. At the 1992 culmination of the Australian Journalists Association (AJA) national press card registration became MEAA’s responsibility; press card registrations have declined, and over the same period, newsrooms have become increasingly de-unionized. AJA press card registration had provided uniform identification, and defined media workers’ roles. 

Journalist Information Warrants - Surveillance of Australian Journalists Pt 2

My last post was meant to flow freely into the next, but exams got in the way - sorry readers. But hopefully my studies will enable greater insight into such matters, so it's all for good.

Recapping - the Journalist Information Warrant Scheme is a small schedule of the Telecommunications Interception Act (No 7, actually), and, it presently works in tandem with Australia's (now notorious) Metadata Retention Scheme, which has been lambasted all over the planet for its uniquely intrusive qualities and subversion of basic civil expectations of a democratic state.

Moreover, the #JournalistInformationWarrantScheme has critical flaws and these prevent it acting as an effective protective measure, despite the strength of the oversight mechanisms that legislators have tried to draft in. 

One of the key problems - as identified by MEAA, is an outdated and curiously narrow definition of who is a journalist, which relies on salary rather than product; due to the current state of media employment conditions very few media workers can be identified under this overly-narrow definition. 

Subsequently, that limited authoritarian notion of who is a journalist also places an extra burden on independent scrutineers, charged with defending the privacy of media workers; resultantly case-by-case they must also combat such self-serving, legalistic interpretations of the definition of a journalist.

Notably, when it comes to tax-related surveillance warrants, that definition of "journalist" opens right up, thus enabling numerous agencies to, again, surveil 'every man and his dog'. 

Even Switzerland, which has marketed its IT innovators on the pretence of its neutrality and confidentiality, has signed a data-napping agreement on the grounds of tax avoidance. 

[In relation to the only other (and better-known) Swiss data-sharing agreement - counter-terrorism data isn't sharable but Swiss authorities can compel Switzerland's companies can be called upon to share information to aid in the domestic investigation of foreigners.]

Nonetheless, if the definitions of who is a journalist or identification of journalists was harmonized (perhaps via the existing Press Card system), the #JournalistInformationWarrant schedule could potentially comprise a good template upon which to build a protective regime of independent scrutiny for the interception of journalists, and their communications and data.

The Journalist Information Warrant Scheme has been amended a lot of times (twice in 2019 first quarter) but it still urgently needs important changes. This would not be enough, in itself, to stop raids such as those wielded against Annika Smethurst or the ABC, but it could incentivize and simplify a broader roll out of a protective JIW-like mechanism for media workers. This mental and ethical hurdle is the biggest turning point for authorities, in conceptualizing the right for journalists to maintain a work capacity to meet their legal requirements of confidentiality.

In the first instance those provisions - as a part of this act, would need to be honed. It could then also be used as a regulatory policy template for journalist protections within the context of the delivery and tenor for other laws. Such a template - or "schedule", as an overarching legislative media shield, could function as a sole schedule effective for  all legislation.

Australian Metadata Retention Act Journalist Information Warrants - a short introduction

Journalist Information Warrants comprise a small schedule in the back of the Telecommunications(Interception and Access) Regulations 2017 Act and works in tandem (to protect some journalists)with the Australian Metadata Retention Act. It has potential as a protective civil rights shield to work in tandem with other laws as well.

Originally the Act permitted 81 agencies to access Australian citizens' data (including Australia Post and local councils) and about 5 years later, under inquiry, access was reduced down to about 21 government agencies.

There are inherent difficulties in turning to the public calling for protection of journalists in Australia due to the highly differential quality of 'media content' that is visible. 

Increasingly, journalists are less focal in 'media content' than provocative commentators, and there is a lack of differentiation between the various work-types and roles in media.

While commentators might like to lay claim to being journalists, 'journalists' work to a strict code of conduct, must be accountable to the public via adherence to some form of company or industry regulatory system, and, commit to a process position of relative impartiality.

Also, just as it is encapsulated in advertising law, journalism content (i.e. news content) must be devoid of conflicts of interest, and opinion, and, readers must be able to be visibly differentiate it from advertising and comment - markings, sub-titles, headings, attribution all need to be extremely clear.

None of these professional distinctions are today made particularly clear to readers/media consumers, and this is an erosive workplace pattern in the presentation of media content across platforms that is becoming more common. Ultimately, that is detrimental to journalists, to the availability of news roles, and, it erodes public trust in the terms journalism and news. 

{So, to be clear, the term 'journalism' I am using in this post refers to the strict sense of news and current affairs, which is specifically aimed at supporting a democratic societal function.}

Authorities face a likewise complex task in recognizing actual journalism, and journalism processes.

With the number of journalism jobs spiralling into the commentator-abyss, it is not very surprising that authorities can turn to a conveniently narrow definition. Authorities' narrow definition of a protectable journalist means they seldom need to seek a special Journalist Information Warrant to spy on journalists.

The story does not have to be about classified information to need protection of their processes. In the last month alone, the public has seen police convicted of supplying public third parties (an abusive ex, more specifically) with privileged intelligence. 

Were I, as a reporter, to be writing about a relatively or seemingly innocuous issue - i.e. not a grand Snowden-level leak but say, a construction deal, or a local council corruption matter, or some comparatively (in the global scale of newsworthiness) benign issue that may cause PR damage to a bad company, I too could easily have my privileged, personal, identification data leaked or sold to any interested third party.

(This of course has happened to me, and many other women, before. That leaking or gifting of women's data is called #LoveInt.) 

If we just momentarily glance back at that huge, global scale of giant newsworthy issues to draw from - private investigation agencies tasked with strategic intelligence contracts routinely double dip, selling data initially collected under legitimate aims.

This common but duplicitous practice - for example - brought the US Assange prosecution into question; the Ecuadorian Embassy's security agency had been selling to US authorities, information obtained in the course of their contracted work.

(My Twitter followers will be aware of these story references, I won't link to them here but if anyone wants to know more they can follow my unofficial research account @NewsNResearch.)

Since the commencement of the Australian Metadata Retention Act, Australian authorities have boasted at the Senate's Estimates Committee hearings that few #JournalistInformationWarrants have been needed.

Even the Australian Federal Police have gotten into trouble for not knowing it was necessary - realistically, how could they? But, how realistic is it for an agency to already know that a 3rd party they wish to obtain the data of, or, even a first party to a warrant, is a media worker?

How would a police officer or a lawyer (completely different skillset) even know what journalism or media work is? Worsening this police methodology conundrum, news definitions, salaries, and tasks are today highly complex and variable.

One clearer and easier way to define a journalist would be to require registration for an Australian Press ID card.

This was managed by the Australian Journalists Association before MEAA absorbed it.

MEAA is now responsible for the press ID card system. However, with MEAA acting as a professional association and an industrial advocate, this obvious solution to the intrusions posed by authorities' surveillance, would not be especially popular with the conservative government's union-busting stance.

Here is a little bit of an analysis I have written previously about it.

You can see the ulterior aim of the #JournalistInformationWarrant's narrow journalist definition in play as it is juxtaposed against the alternative broad use of 'journalist' definitions relating to tax - which are far, far more inclusive. 

Thus journalist surveillance can be conveniently eased through current legislative protections. 

I will be writing more about Journalist Information Warrants - this is just a short introduction. I have to apologize for this preliminary posting - I have had a curious amount of trouble with my internet connection this morning, which turned a short post into an epic battle. So it will be subject to revisions and I will pop in the relevant links a bit later after the radiowaves free-up a bit.

Cheerio, Liz.

Currently a wide variety of definitions are utilized by the government, depending on the nature of legislation. A significant number of social texts exist detailing negative impact of restrictive defining criteria on journalists embodied in the “ASIO Act; Foreign Fighters Act; and Data Retention Act”[1]. 

The variability of government legislative definitions of a journalist in the case of the aforementioned national security laws, enables more inclusive opportunities for government collection of data by reducing the number of people defined as journalists[2]. 

However, in contrast, ASIC treasury journalist definitions are quite inclusive, thus allowing more media workers to be surveilled with a view to collecting taxes and levies. Both definitions effectively maximize available data. Key stakeholder suggestions for the reform of the term of journalist, and for a uniform definition drove a parallel reform recommendation from the 2018 Senate Economics Legislation Inquiry[3]. 

Journalist Information Warrants facilitate collection under the auspices of national security[4] embodied in the three aforementioned national security acts[1] but is contained in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Regulations 2017 Act. This act, and the Data Retention Act[2015], have been subject to several amendments.

Footnotes:

[1] Pearson, M. & Fernandez, J. 2019, Surveillance and National Security ‘Hyper-Legislation’: Calibrating Restraints on Rights with a Freedom of Expression Threshold, Chapter 3, in Lidberg & Muller, 2018, In the Name of Security Secrecy, Surveillance and Journalism, Anthem Press, London.

[2] MEAA Summary of submissions describing journalist definitions to: Joint Parliamentary Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (inquiry into whistleblower protections, 2017); Select Committee info the Future of Public Interest Journalism; Senate Standing Committee on Economics Legislation (inquiry into the Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Bill 2017; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (National
Security Legislation Amendment, Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2017; MEAA, 2018, Whistleblower Protection, Pressfreedom.org.au on Medium, accessed 17/4/19 one page accessed 17/4/19 https://pressfreedom.org.au/whistleblower-protection-767bf02feb4

[3] Footnote [iii] Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Economics Legislation inquiry into Treasury Laws
Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Bill 2017, 2018, Parliament of Australia, March 22, in
aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/senate/ecpmp,ocs/whistleblowerbill2017/report in [7] MEAA, 2018,
Whistleblower Protection, Pressfreedom.org.au on Medium, accessed 17/4/19

[4]Hardy, K & Williams, G. (2016) Australian Legal Responses to Foreign Fighters, Criminal Law Journal, Griffith University Research Repository,  one page accessed 2/5/19 www.research-repository.griffith.edu.au/ 

Tjiwarl Country Appeal against Yeelirrie Uranium Mine Approval Fails

 ###################### PLEASE BE AWARE THAT

THE FOLLOWING STORY MAY CONTAIN IMAGES

OR NAMES OF DECEASED PERSONS. ################

With respect.


Continue to story below...

CCWA has lost the appeal that they were waging against the Yeelirrie uranium mine on behalf of the Tjiwarl Elders and Traditional Owners. Ironically, the appeal was against the present state Labor government, which had nothing to do with the approval.

The case rested on one of the conditions of the Environmental Protection Agency's report on the project, which said that there was a risk the mine could kill off species of stygofauna that are unique to the area.

The appeal challenged the ministerial power of veto over the 2016 recommendations of the Environmental Protection Authority.

Tjiwarl Traditional Owner Vicki Abdullah said despite the loss of this, their second appeal, that the Tjiwarl group's position on the uranium mine's operations was unchanged. She added that they would be making plans for the next step in their long-running battle to preserve the area.

Tjiwarl Traditional Owner Vicki Abdullah outside WA Supreme Court

Last year Ms Abdullah commented that the mining of uranium is especially problematic for the local Aboriginal nations due to its potentially deathly effects. This contrasts their position on an existing local gold mine, and, a new iron ore mine that last month got the go-ahead from surrounding nations.

Western Desert nations were witness to England's nuclear bomb tests in the cross-border region in 1953. A 1980s Royal Commission into the high rates of cancer in those nations and among the Australian service personnel who worked on the tests, found England had told the Australian government that the test would be about a third of the strength of the bomb that they actually tested.

Despite the horrific revelations of culpability from the Royal Commission, England fought and refused reparations. They denied responsibility for the bomb being 3x the strength that the Australian government agreed to and also claimed that victims couldn't prove that their cancers were caused by Maralinga's radiation.

Contrary to popular belief, to the nations local to the project Yeelirrie means place of death. That indicates the cultural sensitivity of the area. For many Australian Aboriginal nations the use of the name or image of a deceased person is prohibited under cultural law. 

To date there has been no sacred site litigation in relation to Yeelirrie's connection to the Seven Sisters Songline, according to pro-country anti-nuclear campaigner, Mia Pepper.

The Seven Sisters Songline - one of the most sacred sites in Australia in multiple nations' cultural beliefs. 

For overseas readers, there's more on Aboriginal Songlines, here...

And here, is an hour's program on the Seven Sisters Songline, 
and it features the moving singing and stories of the NPY ladies:

In 2017 a WA state Liberal party environmental protection minister signed off on an approval for the project, despite it still not countering the potential ill-effects on the unique stygofauna.
(I wonder if this video influenced his decision...)

The punchline was, that he granted that final approval two weeks before the election, when his re-election campaign was at full velocity. He lost, but unfortunately for the little stygofauna, both a Labor win and an immediate ban on new uranium mines was insufficient to protect Yeelirrie from possible harmful effects of uranium mining. 

Labor's instant ban was a great vote winner, but not effective retrospectively.

Evidently, WA's Labor government was also not as gutsy as Kyrgyzstan's; Kyrgyzstan in May this year implemented an immediate ban on uranium mining, including those mines already approved and in production. (Though Kygyzstan has not been sued for shutting their 1 struggling mine down, WA's current Environmental Protection minister said he is too scared that the presently suspended uranium operations would send the state broke if they ever sued for damages about loss of income from the ban.)

WA Labor's uranium ban does not even prohibit uranium exploration that according to uranium exploration comanpies' and ALP monthly spin, is going from strength to strength.

Strangely all this occurred irrespective of 2 out of the 3 uranium miners in WA saying uranium production and processing simply isn't economic right now and that there is no indication it will be in the future.

The crux of the latest court finding suggests that current protections embodied in the environmental protection laws are not absolute. 

The background to the issue is that in the resources sector there has been quite a bit of lobbyist agitprop circulated to empathetic publications about Australia's purported slow approval process, and our 'high level' (cough, cough, inaccuracy) of environmental activism. (about as accurate as the number of WA jobs promised from the project - if uranium ever becomes financially viable again)

The recent national Liberal election campaign saw yet another minister for environmental protection sign off on another approval - a federal one for the very same project. 

So, there was a fuss and amid the press scrimmage her colleague Matthias Cormann plonked Price right in it by revealing in plain words how long ago she had approved the project, which suggested that she had hidden it for a busy news day.

Subsequently, when the Liberal party were re-elected to the federal government, she was quietly slipped into a different portfolio.

This all occurred whilst the Tjiwarl appeal was in process.

The director of CCWA Piers Versteegan complained that the possible extinction of any species, regardless of size or significance, contradicts the guiding principle of the state's Environmental Protection Act. 

His concerns echoed an EPA ruling from 2016 that stressed the unique importance of the subterranean fauna of the Yeelirrie region.  In an interview with news agency AAP at that time, the EPA Chairman Tom Hatton said that the risk to the stygofauna was just too great and not mitigated by the project proposal.

The former WA minister for protecting the environment (whose name probably no one will remember by the time the Stygofauna are extinct) simply said there hasn't been enough research done to find the same subterranean fauna elsewhere in Australia's vast expanse and they probably exist somewhere.###

Below is a recording of Versteegan explaining the case outside the Supreme Court of WA, at the launch of CACV 26/2018 - Conservation Council of Western Australia v Dawson

New Research Finds Broccoli Molecule Kickstarts Cancer-Fighting Gene

Photo Credit - Tony Hisgett via WikiMedia Creative Commons

Last month a US research group studying WWP1, a cancer-causing gene, established that a molecule in broccoli restores an often depleted cancer-fighting gene.

The paper from #BethIsraelDeaconessMedicalCenter and the #CancerResearchInstitute shows cancer can be effectively targeted with i3C, a molecule found in broccoli and other cruciferous vegetables.

The findings state that because ‘an increased expression level of… PTEN impairment is widely pervasive in various human cancers, targeting this pathway toward PTEN reactivation may represent an “Achilles heel” of broad application.’

The i3C broccoli molecule had both tumour-preventative and tumour-suppressive effects.

i3C (indole-3-carbinol) was found to rebalance and reactivate an important gene for tumour suppression called PTEN. (PTEN is a gene that in ideal genetic conditions, controls and prevents the growth of cancer.)

The group’s experiments established WWP1 produces an enzyme that causes PTEN to malfunction. It can be over- or underactive, but in both cases i3C aided in restoring normal activity and resulted in tumour cell suppression and abatement (in mice and in human tissue samples).

In hereditary predispositions to cancer, PTEN is likely to have been mutated and it is also one of the more vulnerable genes to changes that predicate malignancies.

Last month’s revelation has also re-energized academic discourse around the subject of broccoli and cancer prevention, indicated by a sharp increase in i3C studies released and even re-released.

Broccoli’s anti-cancer benefits are well known, and in part this common awareness was said to have prompted the research institute’s inclusion of i3C in the WWP1 study.

A study of i3C effects on liver cancer was published last year with researchers suggesting positive indicators of its dual potential as a preventative and treatment.

The Beth Israel research group (which is affiliated with Harvard University Medical School) are keen to further explore possibilities of i3C, and CRISPR technology, for PTEN restoration. 

They plan to study WWP1 and more potent inhibitors, and they asserted that these findings “pave the way” towards development of a tumour-suppressor reactivation approach to cancer treatment.###

Unfinancial Uranium Markets & Global Bans

Western Desert - home to the 4 approved WA uranium mines - photo Elizabeth Murray

One curiosity in successive WA governments’ approach to uranium mining, approvals, and related expensive court costs, is that the unsustainable price of uranium is widely known.

It was even investigated by South Australia, which funded a Royal Commission into the viability of the Nuclear Energy Cycle just four years ago.

The 2015 Royal Commission found despite known cost benefits of uranium, an uncertain and oversupplied market rendered development of the state’s uranium processing capabilities uneconomic until 2026 at least. (Jacobs' approvals were in 2017, Price's 2019 - still another 7 years to go...) 

It also flagged dire public concerns over the use and development of uranium, which would render political involvement in the process futile.

Cameco and Toro, owners of three of WA’s uranium projects, have reported that they are taking a wait-and-see approach with the market downturn.

Toro has commenced gold exploration on their Wiluna site, and it is clear they are looking for workable solutions to uranium’s current financial dead end. An existing gold mine is already in the region and has generated far less community concern and resistance than uranium proposals.

Cameco’s 2019 first quarter report last week reassured shareholders by saying that its WA operations – Yeelirrie and Kintyre, were ready should the uranium price recover at some point in the future.

Around the time of WA Environment Minister Albert Jacob’s pre-election approvals (now former minister), Cameco had already quite openly taken protective steps to steel itself against the declining market. 

The company had redirected the Australian CEO to Canada and shuttered two of its largest uranium mines (in Canada) that produced as much as 10% of the world’s uranium supply.

Despite WA government media statements lauding the future jobs and wealth those projects would create, there the Barnett government included no fine print about the spiralling financial decline of uranium and processing.

The 2017 government justifications for the project approvals of plentiful jobs, and vast economic returns, right before the last state election, have an eerily similar ring to Minister Price’s pre-election approval.

In contrast however, Vimy recently told media its Mulga Rock project is proceeding to secondary permitting and licensing, and that it had been “allowed through” Labor’s uranium mining ban.

Labor clearly stated in 2017 it would not enact their uranium mining ban retrospectively, due to government fears previously approved companies (Cameco, Toro Energy and Vimy Resources) could sue.

This blog revealed last week, it also does not stop uranium exploration by dedicated uranium exploration companies.

Notably, since Kyrgyzstan declared it would implement a uranium mining ban last month due to public pressure, its one uranium mining company, Azarga, has simply suspended production even though it has not had its license revoked.

The unfinancial price of uranium has stalled uranium mining in WA for the time being and Vimy is evidently taking care of administrative business until it rises. Hence, the flexuous WA uranium mining ban does not at this stage, or in the near future, look like it has any challenges except for those posed by its own limitations.

Vimy’s persistent optimism amid longstanding unprofitable markets, appears to be a firm public relations policy differentiating it from the ongoing, candid comments of its rivals on market conditions.  

Vimy’s stance on public communications more generally has drawn questions and criticism in the past (ASIC was approached for confirmation of the two matters but said they could not confirm or deny complaints).

The company has sought to move in response to the uranium probe in the US; two US-based suppliers have called for a 25% domestic stake in uranium supply. 

Some have speculated that potential supply and demand problems stemming from changes in US trade policy may see the price rise.

##NB Dr Cameron Murray, who is the author of the Australian Institute report linked above is not related to the author of this blog.

Camp - Australian Outback, Photo - Elizabeth Murray

Uranium Ban Shortcomings Worry, After Big Labor Loss

A uranium mining ban implemented by the incumbent Western Australian Labor government in 2017 looked like a game changer for the various campaigners, some of whom have been fighting on this front since the 1970’s.

Most watchful eyes are now focused on the David and Goliath court battle waged by the remote Tjiwarl Elders against the slick machinations of the Liberals’ state and federal environmental approval processes.

But a year out from the next WA state election and hot on the heels of yet another turn towards the conservative Liberal government, the ban's shortcomings look set to cause long-term problems. 

West Australia's Western Desert region - supplied CCWA

Environment Minister, Melissa Price, her federal electorate squarely in WA uranium country, appeared to jumped the gun right before the election was called, to grant approval to Cameco’s Yeelirrie mine. This was despite her previous commitment to waiting out the court process, and, that the matter was still under appeal in the WA Courts.

For all her trouble Cameco’s praise just highlighted the emptiness of that play – that without a sustainable market, the project’s stasis simply continues uninterrupted. 

The optics and allegations that Price took and acted upon the owner’s advice mired her election campaign. The Opposition called for an inquiry, and following the re-election of the federal Liberal government Price was shipped out to the Defence Industries portfolio to work in tandem with a more senior minister in an adjacent portfolio.

Cameco comments on Price advice – Slezak: Government Approved Mine Day Before the Election Called_ABC
(Link Above)

Price's Yeelirrie approval looked carefully-timed to reduce media attention, right before the ANZAC Day national holiday. After its discovery, seemingly, Price went to ground. 

Matthias Cormann supportively stepped in for his colleague, confirming she had not snuck the approval through the day before the election was called. He clarified that she had actually had the approval since March 5.

Cormann comments on March 5 approval_SBS_AAP (Linked Above)

Ban Shortcomings - Bigger Problems Ahead?

Vicki Abdullah - Tjiwarl Traditional Owner
& 1 of the Appeal Applicants - Supplied

The ban’s weaknesses have been relatively unnoticeable behind the media spectacle surrounding both, the Tjiwarl Appeal, and, the controversial nature of the former WA government’s sudden 2017 uranium mine approvals. 

Initially, West Australians were told it was virtually impossible for the ban to be used retrospectively to reverse those pre-2017 election approvals. The risk of litigation by the companies was just too high according to the minister.

However, last month, one country that has previously suffered radioactive fallout, took that risky step. 

Kyrgyzstan implemented a total ban after heated protests spread through major centres. The protest movement evinced longstanding public anger over radiation leaks. The capacity of Kyrgyzstan’s ban to retrospectively outlaw uranium mines was planned to balance society’s new priorities against old government approvals. 

However, Australia has also experienced fallout :

In the 1950s atomic tests were facilitated by PM Robert Menzies, and English political lobbyists whose government failed to accurately disclose the dangers or prevent fallout exposure. Menzies was eager to develop economic benefits from nuclear science. 

Tests took place at locations deemed remote and uninhabited, but which were occupied by Aboriginal nations. There were complaints about fallout after the first test. Menzies then signed on for more tests, while English authorities cruelly quipped, that Aboriginal people who were adversely affected should vote (pre-1967-referendum). 

Australian servicemen were also exposed and not adequately protected or warned. In 2003 England denied them compensation for their health problems and their children’s, on the basis they couldn't prove the cause was the 1950s fallout. 

The McClelland Royal Commission 15 years earlier, said high cancer rates probably stemmed from this fallout exposure and also, for the first time, revealed the true extent of Menzies' and England's deceptive misconduct.

The routine litigation argument against a retroactive uranium mining ban, is considerably less onerous for Kyrgyzstan’s government due to the limited number and size of the country’s uranium projects, compared to Western Australia’s. 

In contrast, Western Australia's ban - regardless of possible good intentions, is far less comprehensive and has some surprising shortfalls. These have become particularly obvious after last month's federal Liberal election win. 

One potential issue that exists in WA's ban is that it has no apparent capacity to circumvent uranium-focused mining exploration, which is currently thriving. 

So, 2 years on from the historic reimplementation of WA Labor’s vital uranium mining ban, there are still 4 WA uranium mining projects. 
And, potentially, there could be many more on the horizon. 

Western Australia's Western Desert region - supplied CCWA

The state and federal Liberals’ strong advocacy for the nuclear sector, and, the present, unrestricted mining exploration licenses, will likely underscore more uranium project approvals if the party wins the 2020 or 2023 state election. 

The 4 existing projects are:  

• Vimy Resources’ Mulga Rock (180km from Laverton);  
• Cameco’s Yeelirrie project(Western Desert, 70km out of Wiluna); 
• Kintyre project(near Jigalong in the Pilbara); and,
• the Wiluna project belonging to Toro and Mega Uranium. 

Ironically, WA’s 4 approved projects have not been stymied by the 
WA Labor government’s determined efforts to protect the environment via the ban, 
but by the low-price of uranium since the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster.

By the end of last year 49 exploration licenses had reported expenditure for uranium. The government cannot identify which exploration companies are uranium-focused until they report expenditure for uranium, and it ‘may be found unintentionally when exploring for other minerals.’ 
- mining ministry spokesperson.

Although,
some of those licensed exploration companies are really open about their uranium interests. For some it is their selling point on the ASX. Just 1 example, of innumerable exploration companies operating in WA, has 6 WA exploration licenses, including 3 promising ones in the Wiluna region. 

The company is meeting its obligations, the ministry assures, but it may be reasonable to consider if the uranium ban is actually meeting its.

Even though the government ‘has implemented a “no uranium mining” condition on future mining leases, it does not intend to change the regulatory system for uranium exploration,’ the spokesperson said.

Moreover,
last year exploration applications showed a rapid escalation from the usual 200-per-month average, to 366 in May and 300 in June...etc etc. This monthly figure is indicative of the high quantity of new active licenses in resources-driven WA. 

The government enthusiastically supports the state's huge and highly influential mining industry, by encouraging exploration (of various minerals) with a co-funding scheme. The state's economy has long been very reliant on revenue stemming from mining and is still rebalancing from a number of economic shocks in recent years.

In 2018 – just a year after the reimplementation of Labor's epic uranium mining ban, approvals for companies openly looking for uranium were granted. These exploration licenses do not end until 2023. They will span the next 2 WA elections. There is no guarantee of 1 Labor win, let alone 2. 

The uranium mining ban has no preventative measures built into it for the unexpected election outcome of a Labor loss. Also, as the ban is not retroactive, it cannot prevent a recurrence of present mine approval-related problems, after future WA Liberal government terms. 

Even during WA Labor terms, exploration companies are not hindered in finding and mapping uranium discoveries, possibly even co-funded. Companies buying into those discoveries will be free to seek project approvals during future Liberal government terms. ###

Shirley Wonyabong - Yeelirrie Appeal Applicant and Tjwarl Elder - Photo Supplied