Journalist Information Warrants comprise a small schedule in the back of the Telecommunications(Interception and Access) Regulations 2017 Act and works in tandem (to protect some journalists)with the Australian Metadata Retention Act. It has potential as a protective civil rights shield to work in tandem with other laws as well.
Originally the Act permitted 81
agencies to access Australian citizens' data (including Australia Post
and local councils) and about 5 years later, under inquiry, access was
reduced down to about 21 government agencies.
There are inherent difficulties in turning to the public calling for protection of journalists in Australia due to the highly differential quality of 'media content' that is visible.
Increasingly, journalists are less focal in 'media content' than provocative commentators, and there is a lack of differentiation between the various work-types and roles in media.
While commentators might like to lay claim to being journalists, 'journalists' work to a strict code of conduct, must be accountable to the public via adherence to some form of company or industry regulatory system, and, commit to a process position of relative impartiality.
Also, just as it is encapsulated in advertising law, journalism content (i.e. news content) must be devoid of conflicts of interest, and opinion, and, readers must be able to be visibly differentiate it from advertising and comment - markings, sub-titles, headings, attribution all need to be extremely clear.
While commentators might like to lay claim to being journalists, 'journalists' work to a strict code of conduct, must be accountable to the public via adherence to some form of company or industry regulatory system, and, commit to a process position of relative impartiality.
Also, just as it is encapsulated in advertising law, journalism content (i.e. news content) must be devoid of conflicts of interest, and opinion, and, readers must be able to be visibly differentiate it from advertising and comment - markings, sub-titles, headings, attribution all need to be extremely clear.
None of these professional distinctions are today made particularly clear to readers/media consumers, and this is an erosive workplace pattern in the presentation of media content across platforms that is becoming more common. Ultimately, that is detrimental to journalists, to the availability of news roles, and, it erodes public trust in the terms journalism and news.
{So, to be clear, the term 'journalism' I am using in this post refers to the strict sense of news and current affairs, which is specifically aimed at supporting a democratic societal function.}
Authorities face a likewise complex task in recognizing actual journalism, and journalism processes.
With the number of journalism jobs spiralling into the commentator-abyss, it is not very surprising that authorities can turn to a conveniently narrow definition. Authorities' narrow definition of a protectable journalist means they seldom need to seek a special Journalist Information Warrant to spy on journalists.
The story does not have to be about classified information to need protection of their processes. In the last month alone, the public has seen police convicted of supplying public third parties (an abusive ex, more specifically) with privileged intelligence.
With the number of journalism jobs spiralling into the commentator-abyss, it is not very surprising that authorities can turn to a conveniently narrow definition. Authorities' narrow definition of a protectable journalist means they seldom need to seek a special Journalist Information Warrant to spy on journalists.
The story does not have to be about classified information to need protection of their processes. In the last month alone, the public has seen police convicted of supplying public third parties (an abusive ex, more specifically) with privileged intelligence.
Were I, as a reporter, to be writing about a relatively or seemingly innocuous issue - i.e. not a grand Snowden-level leak but say, a construction deal, or a local council corruption matter, or some comparatively (in the global scale of newsworthiness) benign issue that may cause PR damage to a bad company, I too could easily have my privileged, personal, identification data leaked or sold to any interested third party.
(This of course has happened to me, and many other women, before. That leaking or gifting of women's data is called #LoveInt.)
(This of course has happened to me, and many other women, before. That leaking or gifting of women's data is called #LoveInt.)
If we just momentarily glance back at that huge, global scale of giant newsworthy issues to draw from - private investigation agencies tasked with strategic intelligence contracts routinely double dip, selling data initially collected under legitimate aims.
This common but duplicitous practice - for example - brought the US Assange prosecution into question; the Ecuadorian Embassy's security agency had been selling to US authorities, information obtained in the course of their contracted work.
(My Twitter followers will be aware of these story references, I won't link to them here but if anyone wants to know more they can follow my unofficial research account @NewsNResearch.)
This common but duplicitous practice - for example - brought the US Assange prosecution into question; the Ecuadorian Embassy's security agency had been selling to US authorities, information obtained in the course of their contracted work.
(My Twitter followers will be aware of these story references, I won't link to them here but if anyone wants to know more they can follow my unofficial research account @NewsNResearch.)
Since the commencement of the Australian Metadata Retention Act, Australian authorities have boasted at the Senate's Estimates Committee hearings that few #JournalistInformationWarrants have been needed.
Even the Australian Federal Police have gotten into trouble for not knowing it was necessary - realistically, how could they? But, how realistic is it for an agency to already know that a 3rd party they wish to obtain the data of, or, even a first party to a warrant, is a media worker?
How would a police officer or a lawyer (completely different skillset) even know what journalism or media work is? Worsening this police methodology conundrum, news definitions, salaries, and tasks are today highly complex and variable.
Even the Australian Federal Police have gotten into trouble for not knowing it was necessary - realistically, how could they? But, how realistic is it for an agency to already know that a 3rd party they wish to obtain the data of, or, even a first party to a warrant, is a media worker?
How would a police officer or a lawyer (completely different skillset) even know what journalism or media work is? Worsening this police methodology conundrum, news definitions, salaries, and tasks are today highly complex and variable.
One clearer and easier way to define a journalist would be to require registration for an Australian Press ID card.
This was managed by the Australian Journalists Association before MEAA absorbed it.
MEAA is now responsible for the press ID card system. However, with MEAA acting as a professional association and an industrial advocate, this obvious solution to the intrusions posed by authorities' surveillance, would not be especially popular with the conservative government's union-busting stance.
This was managed by the Australian Journalists Association before MEAA absorbed it.
MEAA is now responsible for the press ID card system. However, with MEAA acting as a professional association and an industrial advocate, this obvious solution to the intrusions posed by authorities' surveillance, would not be especially popular with the conservative government's union-busting stance.
Here is a little bit of an analysis I have written previously about it.
Thus journalist surveillance can be conveniently eased through current legislative protections.
You can see the ulterior aim of the #JournalistInformationWarrant's narrow journalist definition in play as it is juxtaposed against the alternative broad use of 'journalist' definitions relating to tax - which are far, far more inclusive.
Thus journalist surveillance can be conveniently eased through current legislative protections.
I will be writing more about Journalist Information Warrants - this is just a short introduction. I have to apologize for this preliminary posting - I have had a curious amount of trouble with my internet connection this morning, which turned a short post into an epic battle. So it will be subject to revisions and I will pop in the relevant links a bit later after the radiowaves free-up a bit.
Cheerio, Liz.
Currently a wide variety of definitions are utilized by the government, depending on the nature of legislation. A significant number of social texts exist detailing negative impact of restrictive defining criteria on journalists embodied in the “ASIO Act; Foreign Fighters Act; and Data Retention Act”[1].The variability of government legislative definitions of a journalist in the case of the aforementioned national security laws, enables more inclusive opportunities for government collection of data by reducing the number of people defined as journalists[2].However, in contrast, ASIC treasury journalist definitions are quite inclusive, thus allowing more media workers to be surveilled with a view to collecting taxes and levies. Both definitions effectively maximize available data. Key stakeholder suggestions for the reform of the term of journalist, and for a uniform definition drove a parallel reform recommendation from the 2018 Senate Economics Legislation Inquiry[3].Journalist Information Warrants facilitate collection under the auspices of national security[4] embodied in the three aforementioned national security acts[1] but is contained in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Regulations 2017 Act. This act, and the Data Retention Act[2015], have been subject to several amendments.
Footnotes:
[1] Pearson, M. & Fernandez, J. 2019, Surveillance and National Security ‘Hyper-Legislation’: Calibrating Restraints on Rights with a Freedom of Expression Threshold, Chapter 3, in Lidberg & Muller, 2018, In the Name of Security Secrecy, Surveillance and Journalism, Anthem Press, London.
[2] MEAA Summary of submissions describing journalist definitions to: Joint Parliamentary Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (inquiry into whistleblower protections, 2017); Select Committee info the Future of Public Interest Journalism; Senate Standing Committee on Economics Legislation (inquiry into the Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Bill 2017; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (National
Security Legislation Amendment, Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2017; MEAA, 2018, Whistleblower Protection, Pressfreedom.org.au on Medium, accessed 17/4/19 one page accessed 17/4/19 https://pressfreedom.org.au/whistleblower-protection-767bf02feb4
[3] Footnote [iii] Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Economics Legislation inquiry into Treasury Laws
Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Bill 2017, 2018, Parliament of Australia, March 22, in
aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/senate/ecpmp,ocs/whistleblowerbill2017/report in [7] MEAA, 2018,
Whistleblower Protection, Pressfreedom.org.au on Medium, accessed 17/4/19
[4]Hardy, K & Williams, G. (2016) Australian Legal Responses to Foreign Fighters, Criminal Law Journal, Griffith University Research Repository, one page accessed 2/5/19 www.research-repository.griffith.edu.au/
