Tuesday, 17 December 2019

Journalist Information Warrants - Surveillance of Australian Journalists Pt 2


My last post was meant to flow freely into the next, but exams got in the way - sorry readers. But hopefully my studies will enable greater insight into such matters, so it's all for good.

Recapping - the Journalist Information Warrant Scheme is a small schedule of the Telecommunications Interception Act (No 7, actually), and, it presently works in tandem with Australia's (now notorious) Metadata Retention Scheme, which has been lambasted all over the planet for its uniquely intrusive qualities and subversion of basic civil expectations of a democratic state.

Moreoverthe #JournalistInformationWarrantScheme has critical flaws and these prevent it acting as an effective protective measure, despite the strength of the oversight mechanisms that legislators have tried to draft in. 

One of the key problems - as identified by MEAA, is an outdated and curiously narrow definition of who is a journalist, which relies on salary rather than product; due to the current state of media employment conditions very few media workers can be identified under this overly-narrow definition. 

Subsequently, that limited authoritarian notion of who is a journalist also places an extra burden on independent scrutineers, charged with defending the privacy of media workers; resultantly case-by-case they must also combat such self-serving, legalistic interpretations of the definition of a journalist.

Notably, when it comes to tax-related surveillance warrants, that definition of "journalist" opens right up, thus enabling numerous agencies to, again, surveil 'every man and his dog'. 

Even Switzerland, which has marketed its IT innovators on the pretence of its neutrality and confidentiality, has signed a data-napping agreement on the grounds of tax avoidance. 

[In relation to the only other (and better-known) Swiss data-sharing agreement - counter-terrorism data isn't sharable but Swiss authorities can compel Switzerland's companies can be called upon to share information to aid in the domestic investigation of foreigners.]

Nonetheless, if the definitions of who is a journalist or identification of journalists was harmonized (perhaps via the existing Press Card system), the #JournalistInformationWarrant schedule could potentially comprise a good template upon which to build a protective regime of independent scrutiny for the interception of journalists, and their communications and data.

The Journalist Information Warrant Scheme has been amended a lot of times (twice in 2019 first quarter) but it still urgently needs important changes. This would not be enough, in itself, to stop raids such as those wielded against Annika Smethurst or the ABC, but it could incentivize and simplify a broader roll out of a protective JIW-like mechanism for media workers. This mental and ethical hurdle is the biggest turning point for authorities, in conceptualizing the right for journalists to maintain a work capacity to meet their legal requirements of confidentiality.

In the first instance those provisions - as a part of this act, would need to be honed. It could then also be used as a regulatory policy template for journalist protections within the context of the delivery and tenor for other laws. Such a template - or "schedule", as an overarching legislative media shield, could function as a sole schedule effective for  all legislation.